Miscarriage, Abortion, and Disease.

The frequency of death from miscarriage is very high, greater than the number of deaths from induced abortion or major diseases. Berg (2017 , Philosophical Studies 174:1217-26) argues that, given this, those who contend that personhood begins at conception (PAC) are obliged to reorient their resources accordingly-towards stopping miscarriage, in preference to stopping abortion or diseases. This argument depends on there being a basic moral similarity between these deaths. I argue that, for those that hold to PAC, there are good reasons to think that there is no such similarity. There is a morally relevant difference between preventing killing and letting die, giving PAC supporters reasons to prioritize reducing abortion over reducing miscarriage. And the time-relative interest account provides a morally relevant difference in the badness of death of miscarriages and deaths of born adults, justifying attempts to combat major diseases over attempts to combat miscarriage. I consider recent developments in the literature and contend that these new arguments are unsuccessful in establishing moral similarities between deaths from miscarriage and abortion, and deaths from miscarriage and disease.

Anti-abortionist Action Theory and the Asymmetry between Spontaneous and Induced Abortions.

This essay defends the asymmetry between the badness of spontaneous and induced abortions in order to explain why anti-abortionists prioritize stopping induced abortions over preventing spontaneous abortions. Specifically, it argues (1) the distinction between killing and letting-die is of more limited use in explaining the asymmetry than has sometimes been presumed, and (2) that accounting for intentions in moral agency does not render performances morally inert. Instead, anti-abortionists adopt a pluralist, nonreductive account of moral analysis which is situated against a backdrop that sees the limits of our ability to control the process of fertility as themselves valuable. Although this view is complex, the paper concludes by arguing that it has the advantage of explaining features of the anti-abortion outlook that have sometimes been overlooked. First, it accounts for why the pre-Roe regime of abortion restrictions primarily imposed penalties on doctors who induced abortions rather than the women who seek them. Second, it explains why the advent of ectogestation will not prompt anti-abortionists to compromise on 'disconnect abortions,' which putatively let the embryo die by extracting it from the mother's womb.

How Not to Defend the Unborn.

It is sometimes proposed that killing or harming abortion providers is the only logically consistent position available to opponents of abortion. Since lethal violence against morally responsible attackers is normally viewed as justified in order to defend innocent parties, pro-lifers should also think so in the case of the abortion doctor and so they should act to defend the unborn. In our paper, we defend the mainstream pro-life view against killing abortion doctors. We argue that the pro-life view can, in various ways, reject the assumption that defensive violence to save innocent individuals is always permissible. Now even if that assumption is accepted, we contend that defensive violence against abortion doctors still is not justified. Drawing on Frances Kamm's work, we contend that there are structural similarities between abortion and letting someone die who needs your help to stay alive; and we argue that it is impermissible to kill those who kill in order to avoid giving life-saving aid.

Miscarriage Is Not a Cause of Death: A Response to Berg's "Abortion and Miscarriage".

Some opponents of abortion claim fetuses are persons from the moment of conception. Call these "Personhood-At-Conception" (or PAC), opponents of abortion. Amy Berg (2017, Philosophical Studies 174:1217-26) argues that if fetuses are persons from the moment of conception, then miscarriage kills far more people than abortion. Thus, PAC opponents of abortion must "immediately" and "substantially" shift their attention, resources, etc., toward preventing miscarriage or admit they do not believe that personhood begins at conception (or, at least, they should recognize they are not acting in ways consistent with this belief). Unfortunately, Berg's argument fails at every step. After outlining her argument, I show that her claim-that "miscarriage . . . is much deadlier than abortion"-is false (when taken literally) and misleading otherwise. Further, Berg's argument is identical in structure to a criticism sometimes levied against the "Black Lives Matter" movement. In the latter context, the argument has been vehemently rejected. Berg's argument should be rejected for the same reasons. Finally, Berg cites no evidence when claiming that PAC opponents of abortion are "not doing enough" to prevent miscarriage. And, even if PAC opponents of abortion are not diverting substantial funds toward miscarriage prevention, Berg fails to notice that this may be for good reason.

On the impairment argument.

Most opposition to abortion stands or falls on whether a fetus is the sort of being whose life it is seriously wrong to end. In her influential paper 'A defense of abortion,' Judith Jarvis Thomson effectively sidesteps this issue, assuming the fetus is a person with the right to life yet arguing this alone does not give it the right to use the mother's body. In a recent article, Perry Hendricks takes inspiration from Thomson and assumes the fetus is not a person, arguing that abortion is wrong because causing fetal impairment is wrong and abortion is worse than causing fetal impairment. Here I argue Hendricks' impairment argument fails. For Hendricks, risking fetal impairment is wrong because it risks harm to a future person, but if we assume the fetus is not a person, abortion doesn't harm anyone, it merely prevents them from existing.

Vital prostheses: Killing, letting die, and the ethics of de-implantation.

Disconnecting a patient from artificial life support, on their request, is often if not always a matter of letting them die, not killing them-and sometimes, permissibly doing so. Stopping a patient's heart on request, by contrast, is a kind of killing, and rarely if ever a permissible one. The difference seems to be that procedures of the first kind remove an unwanted external support for bodily functioning, rather than intervening in the body itself. What should we say, however, about cases at the boundary-procedures involving items that seem bodily in some respects, but not others? When, for instance, does deactivating an implanted device like a pacemaker count as killing, and when as letting die? Contra existing proposals, I argue that the boundaries of the body for this purpose are not drawn at the boundaries of the self, or (if this is different) the human organism. Nor should we determine when we are killing and when we are letting die by deferring to existing practices for distinguishing ongoing from completed treatment. Rather, I argue that whether something (organic or inorganic) counts as body part for purposes of this distinction depends on the results of a normative analysis of the particular character of our rights in it-particularly, whether and in what way these rights ought to be alienable. I conclude by arguing that there are likely good reasons to recognize distinctively "bodily" rights and restrictions in at least some implantable devices.

How do people use 'killing', 'letting die' and related bioethical concepts? Contrasting descriptive and normative hypotheses.

Bioethicists involved in end-of-life debates routinely distinguish between 'killing' and 'letting die'. Meanwhile, previous work in cognitive science has revealed that when people characterize behaviour as either actively 'doing' or passively 'allowing', they do so not purely on descriptive grounds, but also as a function of the behaviour's perceived morality. In the present report, we extend this line of research by examining how medical students and professionals (N = 184) and laypeople (N = 122) describe physicians' behaviour in end-of-life scenarios. We show that the distinction between 'ending' a patient's life and 'allowing' it to end arises from morally motivated causal selection. That is, when a patient wishes to die, her illness is treated as the cause of death and the doctor is seen as merely allowing her life to end. In contrast, when a patient does not wish to die, the doctor's behaviour is treated as the cause of death and, consequently, the doctor is described as ending the patient's life. This effect emerged regardless of whether the doctor's behaviour was omissive (as in withholding treatment) or commissive (as in applying a lethal injection). In other words, patient consent shapes causal selection in end-of-life situations, and in turn determines whether physicians are seen as 'killing' patients, or merely as 'enabling' their death.

Abortion and Ectogenesis: Moral Compromise.

The contemporary philosophical literature on abortion primarily revolves around three seemingly intractable debates, concerning the (1) moral status of the fetus, (2) scope of women's rights and (3) moral relevance of the killing/letting die distinction. The possibility of ectogenesis-technology that would allow a fetus to develop outside of a gestational mother's womb-presents a unique opportunity for moral compromise. Here, I argue those opposed to abortion have a prima facie moral obligation to pursue ectogenesis technology and provide ectogenesis for disconnected fetuses as part of a moral compromise.

Eutanasia, matar y dejar morir. Desambiguación del concepto de eutanasia y consideraciones bioéticas esenciales / Euthanasia: To Kill or to Let Die. Concept Disambiguation and Essential Bioethical Considerations / Eutanásia, matar e deixar morrer. Desambiguação do conceito de eutanásia e considerações bioéticas essenciais

Resumen El propósito de este artículo es desambiguar el concepto de "eutanasia", describir las conductas que equivocadamente son asociadas a ella, y diferenciar aquellas que no son eutanasia de aquella única que sí lo es. Además, se hacen las consideraciones bioéticas mínimas en relación con los términos de "eutanasia", "matar" y "dejar morir", y se discuten en pacientes conscientes e inconscientes.

Abstract The purpose of this original paper is to clarify the term "euthanasia", describing the varied conducts wrongly associated with it and distinguishing those that are not euthanasia from the only one that certainly is. Additionally, basic bioethical considerations are presented regarding the terms "euthanasia," "killing" and "letting die," and discussed in relation to conscious and unconscious patients.

Resumo O objetivo deste artigo é desambiguar o conceito de eutanásia, descrever as condutas que, de forma equivocada, são associadas a ele e diferenciar as que não são eutanásia daquela única que realmente é. Além disso, são feitas considerações bioéticas mínimas quanto aos termos "eutanásia", "matar" e "deixar morrer", os quais são discutidos com relação a pacientes conscientes e inconscientes.

Substance, rights, value, and abortion.

Most serious contemporary opposition to abortion is grounded on the belief that human fetuses are members of the same moral category as beings like us, and that the loss of any such life is one of the worst possible losses. Substance view theorists oppose abortion for this reason: in their view beings like us are essentially rational substances with inherent moral worth, and those who perform induced abortion fail to recognize this moral worth. In a recent series of articles, Rob Lovering presents reductio-style arguments against the substance view, in part arguing that it is inconsistent with our intuitions in rescue and spontaneous abortion cases. In a recent reply, Henrik Friberg-Fernros argues that the substance view can evade these problematic implications because of a distinction between killing and letting die. According to this argument, the fetus's right to life is a negative right not to be killed, not a positive right to be rescued, thus the anti-abortion theorist who lets fetuses die acts acceptably. I argue this stance fails to recognize the inherent moral worth that the substance view contends fetuses possess. One who refrains from saving a person, or doesn't care how many people she saves, cannot reasonably claim to value life. Furthermore, this stance is at odds with most contemporary anti-abortion views that oppose induced abortions of both the killing and letting die variety.

The Problem of Spontaneous Abortion: Is the Pro-Life Position Morally Monstrous?

A substantial proportion of human embryos spontaneously abort soon after conception, and ethicists have argued this is problematic for the pro-life view that a human embryo has the same moral status as an adult from conception. Firstly, if human embryos are our moral equals, this entails spontaneous abortion is one of humanity's most important problems, and it is claimed this is absurd, and a reductio of the moral status claim. Secondly, it is claimed that pro-life advocates do not act as if spontaneous abortion is important, implying they are failing to fulfill their moral obligations. We report that the primary cause of spontaneous abortion is chromosomal defects, which are currently unpreventable, and show that as the other major cause of prenatal death is induced abortion, pro-life advocates can legitimately continue efforts to oppose it. We also defend the relevance of the killing and letting die distinction, which provides further justification for pro-life priorities.

Two Ways to Kill a Patient.

According to the Standard View, a doctor who withdraws life-sustaining treatment does not kill the patient but rather allows the patient to die-an important distinction, according to some. I argue that killing (and causing death) can be understood in either of two ways, and given the relevant understanding, the Standard View is insulated from typical criticisms. I conclude by noting several problems for the Standard View that remain to be fully addressed.

Awareness and Attitude of Select Professionals toward Euthanasia in Delhi, India.

INTRODUCTION: The topic of euthanasia has induced differences not only among professionals in the medical fraternity but also in other fields as well. The dying process is being lengthened by the new state of art technologies erupting as such higher pace, and it is at the expense of standard quality of life and of a gracious death. AIM: To study the awareness and attitude toward euthanasia among select professionals in Delhi. METHODOLOGY: It was a questionnaire-based descriptive cross-sectional study. The study population included doctors, nurses, judges, lawyers, journalist, and social activists of Delhi. Tool included a sociodemographic questionnaire, two questions to know awareness regarding euthanasia and a modified euthanasia attitude scale used to measure attitude toward euthanasia. Data were analyzed using Stata 11.2. RESULTS: Through our study, it is evident that professionals who participated in the study (judges, advocates, doctors, nurses, journalists, and social activists) in Delhi were familiar with the term euthanasia. No significant difference was seen in the attitude of professionals of different age group and sex toward euthanasia. CONCLUSION: Through this study, it is found that judiciary group most strongly endorsed euthanasia. The attitude of doctors was elicited from mixed group with doctors belonging to different specialties. Oncologists are not in favor of any form of euthanasia. However, doctors from other specialties did support euthanasia.

Acting to let someone die.

This paper examines the recent prominent view in medical ethics that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment (LST) is an act of killing. I trace this view to the rejection of the traditional claim that withdrawing LST is an omission rather than an act. Although that traditional claim is not as problematic as this recent prominent view suggests, my main claim is that even if we accepted that withdrawing LST should be classified as an act rather than as an omission, it could still be classified as letting die rather than killing. Even though omissions are contrasted with acts, letting die need not be, for one can let die by means of acts. The remainder of the paper is devoted to establishing this claim and addresses certain objections to it.

Does withdrawing life-sustaining treatment cause death or allow the patient to die?

This article discusses recent arguments of Franklin Miller and Robert Truog about withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and causation. The authors argue that traditional medical ethics, and the law, are mistaken to take the view that withdrawal merely allows the patient to die, rather than causing the patient's death, describing such a view as 'patently false'. They argue that the law's continued position to the contrary stems from a moral bias, resulting in the moral and legal fiction that withdrawal does not cause death but lets the patient die. In so arguing, Miller and Truog join a long line of academic criticism of the law that extends back to the seminal decision of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL) and beyond. In this article, I take issue with these claims. I argue that there are reasonable grounds upon which traditional medical ethics and the law can regard withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment as allowing the patient to die rather than causing death, and so the authors' claims that such a view is patently false cannot be sustained. I then tease out the implications of my conclusions for the authors' claim that there is not such a great distinction between withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, euthanasia, and assisted dying. I conclude by discussing some possible objections to my own view.